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Abstract
Augmenting creative performance has the potential to benefit both the individual and our society. Several studies have evaluated
the impact of different behavioral training or induction methods on creativity. However, the findings are mixed and sometimes
contradictory. Four different short-term induction methods which differed along two information processing dimensions—
modality and demand—were compared within a single experimental paradigm alongside a non-induction control group to
determine which was the most effective at improving creativity. A comparison on the experimental inductions revealed that
low-demand induction methods boosted creativity more than high-demand induction methods. However, this pattern was not
maintained when comparisons included the non-induction control. These findings provide insights on important factors and
control variables that need to be taken into account at the level of experimental design in order to be able to evaluate the efficacy
of different induction and training methods on creativity.
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Introduction
Several studies have examined whether creativity can be im-
proved by means of assorted behavioral training or induction
methods, which differ along parameters such as modality type
(cognitive, motor) (Oppezzo and Schwartz 2014; Radel et al.
2015) and context (active task, passive exposure) (Dugosh et al.
2000; Dumas and Dunbar 2016). What is being Binduced^
through these methods is a change in one’s customary pattern
of information processing, andwhat is examined is whether this
altered state of functioning abets behavioral performance on a
given task. Domain-general methods focus on heightening the
engagement of general information processing mechanisms
with a view to estimating the impact of doing so on creative
cognition. For example, in one episodic specificity induction
protocol (Madore et al. 2015) participants view a ~2-min video
of people engaged in household activities. Following this, the
participants are presented mental imagery probes to report de-
tails concerning the events in the viewed video with as much
specificity as possible. Such episodic inductions are believed to
enable wider and deeper access to representations and this re-
trieval of detailed information is held to abet creative perfor-
mance (Dugosh et al. 2000; Madore et al. 2015). These are
distinct from domain-specific methods, such as enhancing ver-
bal creativity by training specific verbal skills (Fink et al. 2010,
2015) (e.g., make slogans for a new product: orange ice cream).
Most induction techniques have focused on Btraining up^
mental operations, but some take the opposite approach by
Bdisrupting^ information processing in some way to improve
creative cognition. In line with evidence showing that cogni-
tive disinhibition can be advantageous for creative perfor-
mance (Abraham 2014; Carson et al. 2003), exhausting atten-
tional resources prior to undertaking a creativity task led to
better performance (Radel et al. 2015). However, such find-
ings are in direct opposition to other well-established evi-
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undergoing an incubation phase facilitates one’s ability to
reach creative insights (Gilhooly 2016; Sio and Ormerod
2009). During incubation, attention is directed away from a
problem through rest or by engaging in monotonous or unde-
manding activities. So the evidence appears paradoxical as it
indicates that conditions of both high and low processing de-
mands can improve creativity. Little is known about the pa-
rameters by which creativity can be facilitated by both these
situations.
Other factors during training or induction can also vary.
Motor or cognitive induction can bestow advantages on crea-
tive performance (Colzato et al. 2013; Fink et al. 2010;
Oppezzo and Schwartz 2014; Sun et al. 2016). The time point
of the induction is also variable; either (A) prior to introducing
the creativity task (e.g., Madore et al. 2015), (B) after the in-
struction to the creativity task but before task performance (e.g.,
Dijksterhuis andMeurs 2006), or (C) during the performance of
the creative task (e.g., Oppezzo and Schwartz 2014). This is of
especial significance given that the inductions could occur dur-
ing different phases of the problem-solving cycle (Preparation→
Incubation→Illumination→Verification) (Wallas 1926), such
that inductions are implemented prior to the Preparation phase
(as in situation A), during the Preparation phase (as in situation
B), or during the Incubation phase (as in situation C).
The duration of induction can also vary with effects seen
after a short period (e.g., within one session, < 5 min session
duration) (Dijksterhuis andMeurs 2006) or a long period (e.g.,
after multiple sessions, > 5 min session duration) (Sun et al.
2016). Lastly, the measures of creativity also differ between
studies with some contrasting divergent and convergent tasks
(Colzato et al. 2013; Oppezzo and Schwartz 2014; Radel et al.
2015) while others explore relevant metrics within divergent
thinking, such as ideational fluency (Madore et al. 2015;
Radel et al. 2015) and ideational originality (Fink et al.
2010; Oppezzo and Schwartz 2014).
So there are multiple influences at play that need to be
teased apart in order to derive a clearer picture of the effects
of training/induction methods on creative cognition. The key
question to seek answers for is which short-term induction
methods work better than the others at improving creative
performance, and what are the conditions under which crea-
tivity is facilitated or reduced. The need to critically consider
the nature of the control task or comparison group to the in-
duction condition is also of relevance. Some studies only em-
ploy one induction condition/group in comparison to a non-
induction condition/group (e.g., walking versus sitting:
Oppezzo and Schwartz 2014; cognitive stimulation 20-
sessions training group vs no-training control group: Sun et
al. 2016). In the absence of a second experimental or control
induction condition/group, it cannot be maintained with high
certainty that the seen improvement is specific to the informa-
tion processing dynamics associated with that induction activ-
ity as opposed to the effect of merely doing something
different from the ordinary. On the other hand, in the studies
that do compare more than one type of training or induction,
many do not employ a no-induction control group as they seek
to compare the efficacy of two different inductions with one
another (e.g., episodic specificity vs non-imagery: Madore et
al. 2015; high inhibition vs low inhibition: Radel et al. 2015).
The disadvantage of this approach is that it is not apparent
whether the enhancement in performance attributed to the
inductions in question was in effect better, worse, or indistin-
guishable from having no induction prior to or during
performance.
In this explorative study, we devised a novel paradigm that
enabled the comparison of multiple short-term active domain-
general induction methods within a single experimental de-
sign. This is operationalized by means of 2 × 2 between-
groups factors, where the first reflects modality of induction
(Motor, Cognitive), and the second reflects the level of
information-processing demand associated with induction
(Low, High). We tracked the effect of these inductions, which
took place prior to the creativity task (situation A as described
above), across a series of trials (within-subjects factor) on
three dependent measures of divergent thinking using an
adapted alternate uses task (Guilford et al. 1960; Runco et
al. 1987): Fluency (number of generated uses), Overall
Originality (uniqueness of generated uses), and Peak
Originality (proportion of highly original uses). We also tested
a separate group of participants who did not undergo any
induction procedure to evaluate how the differences in crea-
tive performance associated with specific induction activities
were borne out when contrasted with that of a no-induction
control group. This experimental design allows us to deter-
mine which of these inductions, if any, are the most advanta-
geous in relation to different facets of creative thinking. The
findings in turn would reveal which types of changes in infor-
mation processing would abet creativity. For instance, better
performance following high-demand inductions would impli-
cate support for the notion of positive biases and outcomes
associated with Bdisruptive^ changes (e.g., Radel et al. 2015),
whereas better performance following low-demand inductions




One hundred and fifty-nine individuals took part in the study
across two separate phases and obtained either a modest mon-
etary incentive or course credit for participation. Of these, 140
people participated in the first phase (only the four experimen-
tal induction groups) and 19 participated in the second phase
(only the no-induction control group). Nine participants were
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omitted from the analysis as they did not meet either the eli-
gibility or inclusion criteria: over 30 years of age (n = 3); left-
handed (n = 1); failure to understand motor–high-demand
training instructions (n = 1); high error rate of over 20% in
cognitive induction tasks (n = 2); incomplete performance on
the standard progressive matrices (SPM) (n = 1); and an SPM
score that translated to an IQ below 85 (n = 1). The final sam-
ple included 150 participants (120 female, 30 male). These
were divided into 5 groups depending on the induction con-
dition they underwent (motor–low demand: n = 29, motor–
high demand: n = 31; cognitive–low demand: n = 34; cogni-
tive–high demand: n = 37; control–no-induction: n = 19).1
The protocols of the study received ethical approval from
the Local Ethics Board at Leeds Beckett University.
Materials and Methods
Participants provided socio-demographic information (e.g.,
gender, age). The following tasks were administered.
(1) Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (revised): This mea-
sures the use dominance of the left or right hand in 7
everyday activities (Oldfield 1971; Williams 2013).
(2) Gough Creative Personality Scale: This measures crea-
tive personality (Gough 1979). Participants tick all ad-
jectives from a list of 30 that describe them, to obtain a
total score.
(3) Abbreviated Torrance Test for Adults (ATTA): This mea-
sures creative ability (Goff and Torrance 2002).
Following the manual guidelines, two raters indepen-
dently scored each participant’s response. The total score
was derived from the norm-referenced measures of flu-
ency, originality, elaboration, and flexibility. Criterion-
referenced indicators were not scored.
(4) Cognitive Induction Tasks: 244 sentences with the last
word missing (e.g., The captain stayed with the sinking
___.) were modeled on stimuli from the Hayling
Sentence Completion Task (Burgess and Shallice
1997), a neuropsychological test to assess verbal re-
sponse initiation (Low Demand) and inhibition (High
Demand) (Collette et al. 2001). Participants were asked
to complete as many sentences as they could within a 10-
min period. The Low Demand group had to provide the
correct word (e.g., ship) that would appropriately com-
plete each sentence and two scores were obtained: total
number of sentences completed, and number of
sentences completed correctly. The High Demand group
had to provide a word that is unconnected or not
meaningfully linked to each of the sentences (e.g., rub),
and three scores were calculated: total number of
sentences completed, number of category A errors
(meaningfully connected word) and category B errors
(semantically connected word).
(5) Motor Induction Tasks: A neutral document (university
statute) was provided and participants were instructed to
copy out the text neatly and legibly for a period of
10 min. The number of lines completed was recorded.
The Low Demand group used their right hand. The High
Demand group used their (non-dominant) left hand and
the text to be copied was presented upside down.
(6) Alternate Uses Task (AUT): This is a test of divergent
thinking (adapted fromGuilford et al. 1960). Participants
were asked to think of as many new and different uses as
possible for six common objects: newspaper, brick,
paperclip, knife, shoe, and light bulb. There was a time
limit of 2 min for each item. Three scores were calculated
from the data for each participant. Fluency is the total
number of acceptable responses. Overall Originality is
the uniqueness of the generated uses which was calculat-
ed from the proportional weighting of each use by the
frequency of its occurrence or the weighted fluency score
(Abraham et al. 2012; Runco et al. 1987). Peak
Originality is the number of highly original uses (gener-
ated by less than 10% of the sample) that were produced
by the participant. Only the first five trials were assessed
further as there was a substantial drop in number of par-
ticipants who completed the sixth trial (n = 123) com-
pared to the previous trials (range of n = 148–150) par-
ticularly among the experimental induction groups,
which suggested the setting in of fatigue after the fifth
trial (missing n in Trial 6: cognitive–high demand = 6,
motor–high demand = 7, cognitive–low demand = 10,
motor–low demand = 3, control = 1).
(7) Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM): This
non-verbal 60-item test measures cognitive intellectual
capacity (Raven et al. 2000). The scores were translated
into IQ values using a published conversion table
(Jensen et al. 1988).
Procedure
The data was collected within group testing sessions in the
university. Participants were pseudo-randomly assigned to
one of four areas as they entered the testing room, one area
for each of the four induction task types, with care taken to
counterbalance the gender distribution across groups. The
testing was conducted in four phases. In phase 1, participants
were instructed to complete tasks 1–3. The assigned induction
task was carried out in phase 2 and the AUT in phase 3. In
phase 4, participants completed Raven’s SPM. A control no-
1 Statistical power was not formally assessed in establishing the required sam-
ple size for this study. Instead, we aimed to recruit to sample sizes that are
typically reported in induction/training studies (e.g., n = 24: Madore et al.
2015; n ~25 per training group: Fink et al. 2015).
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induction group was tested at a later point in time as it became
apparent that it was necessary to have such a group to ascer-
tain whether the differences in creative performance associat-
ed with the induction were better, worse, or no different from
having no induction as all. The only difference in procedure
for the group was the absence of phase 2.
Data Availability The datasets generated during and/or ana-
lyzed during the current study are available from the corre-
sponding author on reasonable request.
Results and Discussion
Findings: Sample Homogeneity and Induction Group
Characterization
All five groups (four induction and one control group) were
not significantly differentiable in terms of gender distribution
(χ2 = 0.15, p = 0.82), age, handedness, IQ (SPM), creative
ability (ATTA), handedness, and creative personality (all
F4150 < 1.64, all p > 0.1) (Table 1).
The motor–high demand group (mean = 5.91, SD = 1.33)
copied significantly fewer lines than the motor–low demand
group (mean = 19.34, SD = 3.86) within the induction period,
indicating that the former induction method was more taxing
(t59 = 18.55, p < 0.001). The cognitive–high demand group
(mean = 56.3, SD = 17.86) finished significantly fewer
sentences than the cognitive–low demand group (mean =
115.1, SD = 31.9), indicating that the former was a more chal-
lenging induction method (t71 = 9.745, p < 0.001). The imple-
mentation of the induction methods with regard to the dimen-
sions of demand was thereby successfully operationalized.
Findings: Immediate Impact of Inductions
The first set of analyses involved comparing responses only
on the first trial of the alternate uses task directly after the
inductions (Table 2). This was in order to discern the
immediate impact of the inductions on creative performance.
ANOVAs on the three dependent measures with induction
modality and induction demand as the fixed factors revealed
that two significant findings, namely the significant impact of
induction demand on overall originality (F1127 = 8.707, p =
0.004, η2 = 0.064) and peak originality (F1127 = 7.262, p =
0.008, η2 = 0.054). This indicates that the low-demand induc-
tions (both cognitive and motor) were associated with greater
levels of originality in the first trial directly after induction. So
when looking for immediate effects of induction, low-demand
inductions are associated with higher levels of overall origi-
nality and peak originality.
However, including the no-induction control within the
analyses rendered these findings inconclusive. ANOVAs
across the three dependent measures with training type as
the fixed factor reveal that the performance of the induction
and non-induction groups on the first trial are not significantly
differentiable in terms of fluency, overall originality, or peak
originality (all F4145 < 2.3, all p > .05). So whatever advantage
is associated with the low-demand inductions compared to
high-demand inductions on creative performance is negligible
when contrasted against performance at baseline, i.e., in the
absence of a prior induction method (Fig. 1).
Findings: Overall Impact of Inductions
The next set of analyses were carried out to compare the in-
fluence of the induction methods across the five trials in order
to determine which types of induction were generally associ-
ated with an significant impact on creativity across the testing
session (Table 2). ANOVAs on the three dependent measures
with induction modality and induction demand as fixed fac-
tors revealed only one significant finding, namely the impact
of induction demand on fluency (F1127 = 4.35, p = 0.039, η
2 =
0.03), indicating that the low-demand inductions (cognitive
and motor) were associated with greater levels of fluency. So
when looking for wide-ranging effects by averaging across the
testing session, low-demand inductions are associated with
higher levels of ideational fluency.
Table 1 Descriptive data—mean
(SD)—for the sample
characteristics across all groups
Cognitive Motor Cognitive Motor Control
High High Low Low No induction
Gender 30 fe: 7 ma 24 fe: 7 ma 27 fe: 7 ma 22 fe: 7 ma 17 fe: 2 ma
Age 20.38 (2.44) 20.00 (1.48) 20.21 (2.00) 21.00 (3.02) 20.42 (2.95)
Handedness 92.47 (10.91) 94.47 (9.53) 92.44 (13.95) 91.13 (13.72) 88.72 (14.93)
IQ 103.76 (8.78) 103.81 (8.32) 107.03 (10.33) 105.24 (7.99) 105.6 (7.74)
CPS 3.38 (4.06) 2.61 (3.51) 3.94 (3.47) 3.31 (3.67) 2.68 (3.32)
ATTATotal 60.32 (9.00) 60.90 (8.94) 60.85 (8.56) 64.21 (9.06) 61.05 (11.76)
ATTAAbbreviated Torrance Tests of creative thinking for Adults,CPS Creative Personality Scale; Fe female,Ma
male, IQ intelligence quotient
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However, including the no-induction control within the anal-
yses rendered these findings inconclusive. ANOVAs across the
three dependent measures with training type as the fixed factor
reveal that the performance of the induction and non-induction
groups across trials are not significantly differentiable in terms of
fluency (F4145 = 1.665, p = .161). So whatever advantage is as-
sociated with the low-demand inductions compared to high-
demand inductions in ideational fluency on creative perfor-
mance is negligible when contrasted against performance at
baseline, i.e., in the absence of a prior induction method (Fig. 2).
Furthermore, there was a significant effect of training type
on overall originality (F4145 = 4.118, p = .003, η
2 = 0.102).
Post-hoc Tukey’s tests confirmed that the control no-
induction condition was associated with the higher overall
originality than all four induction tasks (all t > 3.11, p < .05)
(Fig. 2). So in the case of overall originality across the testing
session, inductions prior to creative performance, particularly
in the case of the high-demand inductions, appear to be detri-
mental to creativity.
Also noteworthy in this context are the highly significant
and positive correlations between fluency and overall origi-
nality (Spearman’s rho = 0.461, p < 0.001) as well as fluency
and peak originality (Spearman’s rho = 0.746, p < 0.001),
which is consistent with previous findings that higher idea-
tional output (fluency) is associated with greater originality in
creative thought (Jung et al. 2015) (Fig. 3).
Table 2 Descriptive Data—mean
(SD)—for the alternate uses task
(AUT) measures (fluency, over-
all originality, and peak originali-
ty) across all groups
Cognitive Motor Cognitive Motor Control
High High Low Low No induction
AUT: trial-by-trial data (five single trials)
Fluency 1 6.76(2.42) 5.84(1.86) 6.97(2.95) 7.07(2.33) 5.89(1.63)
Fluency 2 4.58(1.92) 4.10(1.47) 4.74(2.09) 5.03(1.95) 4.47(1.22)
Fluency 3 4.68(1.83) 4.42(1.31) 4.97(2.21) 4.93(2.00) 5.11(1.20)
Fluency 4 3.28(1.54) 3.32(1.60) 3.50(1.83) 4.00(1.66) 4.21(2.02)
Fluency 5 3.66(1.70) 3.55(1.91) 3.76(1.72) 4.76(2.63) 4.42(1.84)
Originality 1 0.76(0.04) 0.75(0.04) 0.78(0.05) 0.78(0.04) 0.77(0.05)
Originality 2 0.76(0.08) 0.74(0.10) 0.72(0.11) 0.72(0.10) 0.76(0.08)
Originality 3 0.76(0.08) 0.74(0.09) 0.72(0.09) 0.75(0.08) 0.81(0.07)
Originality 4 0.72(0.13) 0.75(0.13) 0.79(0.11) 0.78(0.12) 0.83(0.09)
Originality 5 0.82(0.06) 0.81(0.08) 0.79(0.08) 0.79(0.08) 0.86(0.07)
Peak originality 1 0.78(0.75) 0.65(0.66) 1.09(1.04) 1.17(0.89) 0.89(0.81)
Peak originality 2 1.44(1.27) 1.42(1.31) 1.47(1.26) 1.62(1.47) 1.74(1.24)
Peak originality 3 1.59(1.48) 1.39(1.23) 1.41(1.33) 1.48(1.35) 1.84(1.12)
Peak originality 4 1.17(1.16) 1.26(1.09) 1.24(1.18) 1.89(1.52) 1.79(1.44)
Peak originality 5 1.17(1.12) 1.32(1.19) 1.21(1.15) 1.48(1.53) 2.05(1.31)
AUT: average scores across five trials
AUT: mean fluency 4.57(1.41) 4.25(1.12) 4.79(1.67) 5.16(1.66) 4.82(0.96)
AUT: mean overall originality 0.76(0.05) 0.76(0.45) 0.76(0.05) 0.76(0.05) 0.81(0.03)
AUT: mean peak originality 1.22(0.76) 1.21(0.62) 1.28(0.83) 1.53(0.79) 1.66(0.53)
Fig. 1 Differences between the five groups (cognitive–high demand; cognitive–low demand; motor–high demand; motor–low demand; no-induction–
control) on the three creative performance indices on the first trial (error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals of the mean)
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Findings: Trial-by-Trial Analyses
This block of analyses focused on trial-by-trial responses on
the dependent measures (Table 2). This enabled an under-
standing of the dynamics underlying the influence of the in-
duction methods through the trial series. Repeated measures
ANOVAs (2 × 2 × 5) were carried out with induction modality
(motor, cognitive) and induction demand (high, low) on the
three dependent measures across 5 trials. The findings indicate
that, across all groups, fluency reduced over the course of
series of trials (main effect: F4492 = 86.76, p < 0.001, η
2 =
0.409) (linear trend: t = 16.04, p < 0.001), with the low
demand groups showing higher fluency than the high demand
groups across all trials (group main effect: F1123 = 4.125, p =
0.044, η2 = 0.032). While including the no-induction control
within the analyses led to the disappearance of this significant
group main effect, the main effect for ideational fluency re-
ducing over the course of the five trials remained significant
(F4564 = 79.303, p < .001, η
2 = 0.351) (Fig. 4).
In contrast, overall originality showed a dip following the
first trial and then an increase across the trial series with
highest levels of Originality in the last trial (main effect:
F1123 = 13.57, p < 0.001, η
2 = 0.095) (quadratic trend: t =
5.96, p < 0.001). There was also a significant interaction effect
Fig. 2 Differences between the five groups (cognitive–high demand; cognitive–low demand; motor–high demand; motor–low demand; no-induction–
control) on the three creative performance indices averaged across all five trials (error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals of the mean)
Fig. 3 Scatterplots showing the
highly significant positive
correlations between fluency,
overall originality and peak
originality
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between trial × induction demand (F1123 = 4.6, p = 0.001, η
2 =
0.032), such that low-demand inductions were associated with
higher originality in the first trial and lower originality in the
last trial compared to the high-demand inductions. Including
the no-induction control within the analyses rendered the
group related findings inconclusive. The increase in overall
originality over the trial series was confirmed (Trial main ef-
fect: F4564 = 16.627, p < .001, η
2 = 0.1). While the groups sig-
nificantly differed from one another in overall originality
across trials (Group main effect: F4141 = 4.103, p < .001,
η2 = 0.104), post-hoc Tukey’s tests indicated that the control
no-induction group was associated with greater overall origi-
nality across trials than the four experimental induction groups
(all t > 3.19, all p ≤ .015). There was also a significant interac-
tion effect between group and trial (F16,564 = 1.989, p = .012,
η2 = 0.048) which was driven by a greater differentiation in
the performance of the control group compared to the induc-
tion groups in exhibiting the greater originality each subse-
quent trial (Fig. 4).
Peak originality was associated with a dip following the
first trial and then a sharp increase which flattened across the
remaining trials (main effect: F1123 = 6.12, p = 0.047, η
2 =
0.091) (quadratic trend: t = 3.996, p < 0.001). This pattern
was maintained even after including the no-induction control
within the analyses (main effect: F4564 = 8.308, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.055) (quadratic trend: t = 4.065, p < 0.001) (Fig. 4).
The results from trial-based analyses can be summarized as
follows. Regardless of induction method, participants were
able to generate many more uses in early trials compared to
later trials and they got better at generating more original
responses with time. The increase in originality over time fits
with evidence that strategies used later in the use generation
phase are associated with greater levels of originality (Beaty
and Silvia 2012; Gilhooly et al. 2007). While such studies
examined the changes in originality as a function of time
course within single trials, the current study is the first to show
an increased efficiency in ideational originality over time
across the course of multiple trials. What this response pattern
reflects is still an open question. Candidate factors include the
use of better cognitive strategies over time or increased disin-
hibition owing to fatigue over time.
There were also no advantages associated with experimental
inductions on fluency, overall originality or peak originality. In
fact, in the case of overall originality, inductions prior to creative
performance appear to be disadvantageous for creative cogni-
tion. A caveat in relation to the trial-by-trial analyses is required
at this juncture. As trial order was not counterbalanced across
participants, it could be the case that the findings reflect item-
specific responses rather than a time course effect. While we
believe that the former interpretation is unlikely especially when
considering that the pattern of ideational fluency with each sub-
sequent item was not haphazard but instead followed a smooth
trend, we acknowledge that it is not possible to rule out this item-
specific interpretation. This therefore constitutes a shortcoming
of the present study.
Implications of the Findings
By carrying out different levels of analyses, the current study
provides a rich set of findings from which to interpret the
impact of different short-term induction methods on creative
performance. The trial-by-trial response analyses allow us to
determine the dynamics of influence by the inductions. The
average response analyses allow us to determine the overarch-
ing effect of the inductions. And the response analyses from
the first trial following induction allow us to pinpoint the
immediate consequence of the inductions.
If one were to not take the impact of including a non-
induction control condition, the findings would be in line with
the extensive literature on the positive effects of incubation on
creativity (Gilhooly et al. 2012; Sio and Ormerod 2009), as
they speak to the positive impact of low-demand tasks in
abetting creative performance. Some previous evidence has
demonstrated that high cognitive or motor demand activities
hinder creative output, whereas low cognitive or motor tasks
facilitates creative output (Colzato et al. 2013; Gilhooly 2016;
Ritter and Dijksterhuis 2014; Sio and Ormerod 2009). The
advantage associated with motor–low-demand induction was
Fig. 4 Differences between the five groups (cognitive–high demand; cognitive–low demand; motor–high demand; motor–low demand; no-induction–
control) on the three creative performance indices across the series of five trials (error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals of the mean)
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more sustained in the case of ideational fluency in creativity,
as it was associated with greater levels of fluency in creative
performance across all trials. This would fit with evidence that
showcases the positive influence of undemanding motor ac-
tivities, such as walking, on creativity (Oppezzo and Schwartz
2014). The current findings then do not align seamlessly with
the opposite line of evidence (Radel et al. 2015) namely that
depleting information-processing resources leads to an im-
provement in creative performance, which would be expected
given the hypothesis of the positive impact of mild disinhibi-
tion on creativity (Abraham 2014; Carson et al. 2003).
However, including a non-induction control leads to
considerable upheaval of the findings. The effects in rela-
tion the inductions were in large part not significantly dif-
ferent from having no induction at all. And in the few cases
were differences were apparent, the advantages were asso-
ciated with the non-induction control condition, particular-
ly in the case of overall originality in creative thinking.
In summary, the results of this study showcase a number of
important considerations in relation to training or induction-
based studies and their proven efficacy. At the outset it is im-
portant to specify which phase of the problem-solving process
is being targeted by the inductions—prior to the preparation
phase, during the preparation phase, or during the incubation
phase. The current study examined the impact of different in-
ductions prior to the preparation phase. Furthermore, experi-
mental paradigms should include more than one experimental
inductionmethod alongside a control non-induction baseline to
be assured of the soundness and clarity of the conclusions. It
would also be more efficacious to have a within-subjects im-
plementation of a non-induction control condition so as to
overcome further avenues for variability to be introduced to
the dataset. In addition, the findings point to the need to con-
sider differences in the underlying temporal dynamics in rela-
tion to different key aspects of creative thinking—fluency and
originality—as these were associated with different patterns of
findings. Bearing in mind that the capacity to be creative is
vital to innovation in all spheres of human enterprise (Dutta
2012; Fogarty et al. 2015), quick and accessible strategies that
could enable us to enhance our creative performance, even in
the short term to overcome immediate impasses during creative
idea generation would be very useful. However, in order to
uncover stable and sound strategies to this end, it is vital to
have the necessary checks and controls in place when evaluat-
ing the efficacy of training/induction activities.
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